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During the first half of the 1990s a pool of Italian judges carried out an investigation, named Mani Pulite 
(literally clean hands), that led many public officials to be prosecuted and convicted because of bribery and 
embezzlement. The impact of Mani Pulite was so much influential that since then many indicators suggest a 
steadily decreasing path for corruption in Italy. This paper shows that Mani Pulite was mainly effective in 
deterring corruption as it broke up the feed due to spending in health and social security as well as infrastructure 
investments, mainly those related to public buildings, sanitation, and land reclamation. 
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   1 Introduction
Public policies have the potential to foster economic growth and raise wel-
fare. However, the large amount of funds usually needed to ￿nance such
policies may induce corrupt behaviors of public o¢ cials. This has two im-
plications. On the one hand, in a situation where corruption is rampant we
should ￿nd a positive relationship between corruption and public spending.
On the other hand, after a serious attempt at cracking down on corruption,
we should see that relationship weakened. Hence, such weakening can be
taken as prima facie evidence that the ￿ght against corruption was e⁄ective.
Those implications are indeed what we ￿nd looking at the Italian experi-
ence during 1980-2001. Actually this paper documents a story of success in
￿ghting corruption.
Italy has a long tradition of public policies aimed at fostering growth
and sustaining social cohesion. During the 1980s and 1990s, these policies
were mainly based on large amounts of public expenditure in social security
and investments in infrastructure. As most of such spending is highly dis-
cretionary at di⁄erent levels of the public administration, it becomes natural
to study its relationship with corruption. For instance, the implementation
of a capital project by the central government involves many decisions and
a large number of public o¢ cials at di⁄erent layers of the public administra-
tion. Moreover, the execution of the project is often contracted out to private
enterprises. It follows that some o¢ cials are likely to have high discretionary
power in the management of public funds. Arguably, this happened in Italy
after some laws issued in the 1970s. These laws made the state government
responsible for the revenue side of the public budget but, for many subjects,
relegated to public o¢ cials of local governments and to bureaucrats of other
public institutions many decisions regarding the spending side. Under these
circumstances, if the level of deterrence is relatively low, corruption in the
form of bribes and thefts may be particularly lucrative. Thus Italy comes
out as an interesting case-study for investigating the relationship between
corruption and public spending.
When a cohort with some corrupt individuals takes up o¢ ce, the incen-
tive for any individual to be corrupt may increase (Sah, 1988; Tirole, 1996).
If this happens, corruption will become a widespread phenomenon and a big
push will be needed to destroy it. A massive anti-corruption investigation,
named Mani Pulite, characterized Italy in the ￿rst half of the 1990s. Mani
Pulite shed light on a widely di⁄used system of corrupt agreements and de-
termined the prosecutions and convictions of many politicians, bureaucrats,
2and entrepreneurs. We document the deterring impact of Mani Pulite by
showing that the relationship between corruption and public spending was
positive and statistically signi￿cant during the 1980s and the ￿rst part of the
1990s, that is before Mani Pulite, while it was no more statistically signi￿-
cant from 1995 through 2001. This ￿nding is robust to di⁄erent estimators
and measures of corruption; whether it implies a permanent regime change
is of course di¢ cult to assess given the available data.
A relevant issue of the empirical analysis consists in de￿ning a reliable
measure of the extent of corruption itself. This paper is based on two di-
rectly observable proxies, that is the number of recorded crimes related
to various types of corruption, and the number of bureaucrats convicted
because of their involvement in embezzlement. Thus, estimates reported
constitute a lower bound as the level of e⁄ective corruption may be sub-
stantially higher than the measured one. For both proxies, we ￿nd that
corruption during 1980-1994 was more likely linked to public investments
related to (population-serving infrastructure goods such as) various types of
public buildings ￿ for instance, schools, museums, theaters, and hospitals
￿ and investments in land reclamation, rather than to investments relative
to (space-serving goods such as) transportation infrastructure. Evidence of
a positive relationship between corruption and public expenditure in health
and social security also arises. Since it is realistic to assume that the gov-
ernment raises funds (at least in part) through distortionary taxation, our
results imply that corruption may have turned an otherwise growth-fostering
￿ ow of spending into a policy that may have been growth-depressing on net
for Italy as a whole.
After Becker and Stigler (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1978), the sources
and the consequences of bureaucratic and political corruption have been ex-
tensively investigated. As concerns the sources, the long exposure to democ-
racy as well as the countries￿cultural traditions (Treisman, 2000; Del Monte
and Papagni, 2008), the civil-service quality as well as the relative wage
(Rauch and Evans, 2000; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), and the extent
of the shadow economy (Dreher and Schneider, 2006) appear to be relevant.
As regards the consequences, mixed results emerge depending upon the level
of analysis (Svensson, 2005, and references therein). Looking at the micro
data, corruption clearly depresses ￿rms￿growth and reduces the e¢ cacy of
redistribution (see, for instance, Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Olken, 2006);
moreover, the macro data suggests that corruption is likely to distort the
composition of public spending (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998).
3However, using cross-country data no robust evidence emerges that corrup-
tion negatively a⁄ects long run growth (Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 2005). A
plausible explanation for the mismatch between the micro and macro ev-
idence is that some types of corruption may be e¢ ciency enhancing, by
determining competition for government resources and by speeding up ad-
ministrative procedures.
In general, to measure corruption cross-country analyses exploit subjec-
tive indexes by informed observers while proxies much more related to the
speci￿c contexts have been used in national case studies. This paper looks
at corruption in terms of crimes prosecuted and o¢ cials convicted and in-
vestigates the relationship between corruption and public spending before
and after a signi￿cative event. Thus it is related to a growing recent lit-
erature that infers the presence of corrupt agreements by comparing the
e⁄ects of public spending at di⁄erent points in time, one ￿before￿and one
￿after￿corruption takes place (Golden and Picci, 2005; Olken, 2006; Gorod-
nichenko and Sabirianova Peter, 2006). To the best of our knowledge, the
paper presents the ￿rst evidence of successful ￿ght against corruption in a
large developed country. In this sense it is mostly related to the documented
experiences of corruption-crackdowns in Hong Kong (Skidmore, 1996) and
in the public hospitals of Buenos Aires (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
evolution of corruption in Italy since 1980 while section 3 introduces the
empirical analysis. Section 4 shows the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Corruption in Italy and Mani Pulite
Corruption can be viewed as a by-product of the mis-governance and is de-
￿ned as the misuse of public o¢ ce in order to attain a personal gain. Andvig
et al. (2001) identify six forms of corruption: (i) bribery, when private people
give bribes to bureaucrats as counterparts for avoiding costs or obtaining
bene￿ts; (ii) embezzlement, de￿ned as the theft of resources by those who
have the responsibility of administrating them; (iii) fraud, de￿ned as an
economic crime involving trickery, swindle or deceit; (iv) extortion, concern-
ing money extracted by using coercion, violence or threats; (v) favoritism,
that is the abuse of power implying a corrupted distribution of resources;
(vi) nepotism, that is a special form of favoritism in which an o¢ ce holder
(ruler) prefers his proper kinfolk and family members.
In this paper we exploit two di⁄erent measures of corruption:
4￿ The number of corruption crimes prosecuted. Data refer to a rather
broad group of illegal activities which includes embezzlement, mis-
appropriation of yield to the damage of government, extortion and
bribery agreements; the spatial distribution re￿ ects the province where
the crime was e⁄ectively committed. In the following we will refer to
this variable as Crime.
￿ The number of public o¢ cials convicted for the crime of embezzlement.
Now data just refer to the crime of embezzlement; the spatial distri-
bution re￿ ects the region where the crime was e⁄ectively committed.
We will refer to this variable as Embezzlement.
Note that, according to the Italian Penal Code, corruption (whatever
type) only involves public o¢ cials and persons in charge of public o¢ ces
who abuse of their discretionary power, and that, according to the ISTAT,
crimes related to embezzlement, extortion, and bribery are part of the crimes
against the public administration. Hence, we argue that the data employed
should satisfactorily proxy for the di⁄usion of corruption within the public
administration. In particular, both measures we employ have remarkable
features. The main advantage of Embezzlement is that it relates to o¢ cials
e⁄ectively convicted because of an irreversible provision of sentence, while its
main limit is that it does not capture all forms of corruption as previously
de￿ned. Moreover, under the assumption of concurrence of charges, an
individual is recorded only for that crime which is punished harsher by the
penal code. Hence the level of corruption in a given region, as measured
by Embezzlement, may appear signi￿cantly lower than elsewhere if in that
region many crimes are tied to a single public o¢ cial. The variable Crime
overcomes the previous limits as it refers to the number of crimes, rather than
to the number of public o¢ cials, and it captures the di⁄erent ways through
which corruption may arise. Crime is also available at level of province
letting us to look at the cross-sectional di⁄usion of corruption across a large
number of units. Its main limit emerges by noting that some acts prosecuted
might not correspond to crimes committed.
Table 1 reports a summary of statistics relative to corruption for Italy as
a whole. During the period 1980-2001 the overall number of crimes recorded
was 34,238, with roughly the same shares for embezzlement and other types
of corruption. Public o¢ cials convicted for corruption (as a whole) were
13,251, that is roughly 0.2% of the (mean) public sector employment; now
embezzlement accounts for roughly 40% of the total. The evolution of Crime
5shows an upward trend from 1980 to 1994 and a steadily reduction after-
ward (￿gure 1). Embezzlement ￿ uctuates around 100 until 1989, when it
began to rise sharply towards 350 in 1991 and up to 441 in 1998 (￿gure
2).1 However, it is suggestive to note that the pattern of the number of
public o¢ cials convicted for embezzlement, by the year when the crime was
e⁄ectively committed, is very similar to that of Crime (￿gure 3). In partic-
ular, more than 400 public o¢ cials prosecuted for crimes committed in 1994
were successively convicted. Finally, table 2 reveals that Crime and Em-
bezzlement feature both cross-section variation, measured by the ￿between
standard deviation￿ , and time-series variation, measured by the ￿within
standard deviation￿ .
Self-reinforcing theories of corruption as well as those looking at the
incentive structures embodied in institutions provide a wide set of explana-
tions for the di⁄usion of corruption (see Aidt, 2003, and references therein).
In particular, self-reinforcing theories do not require that a particular event
happens to explain why corruption starts to increase in a given year. In the
presence of dynamic strategic complementarity, due for instance to collective
reputation (Tirole, 1996), the appearance of a number of corrupt individ-
uals, for whatever reason, may increase the expected bene￿t of corruption
thus further increasing corruption and having long-lasting e⁄ects. At least
three distinctive circumstances, however, may also be pointed to explain the
present case.
First, during the 1970s a number of laws were issued in Italy which
determined a large increase in the number of politicians and bureaucrats
and a peculiar type of federalism. In particular, on the basis of two laws
￿ Law No. 281/1970 and Law No. 382/1975 ￿ since the mid of the
1970s decisions relative to the in￿ ow of the public budget are up to the
state government, while a large number of decisions relative to the out￿ ow
are up to the local administrations and other public institutions. It is a
widely shared opinion that the decentralization of important decisions just
in terms of spending ￿ for instance, relative to some forms of public pensions
or to the tender approval and contracting process for undertaking a capital
project ￿ increased the temptation for corrupt behavior mainly because
institutional controls were weak.2
1The pattern observed for Embezzlement does not change when considering the number
of public o¢ cials convicted either relative to the number of people employed in the public
sector or relative to the population. Moreover, a similar evolution characterizes public
o¢ cials convicted for corruption.
2Since the level of spending was not constrained by the aggregate level of tax revenues,
6Second, historically Italian governments have made large use of public
spending with the aim of fostering growth and sustaining social cohesion. In
particular, since 1980 public investment in infrastructure and public spend-
ing in social security have been the two main policy instruments.3 Since the
implementation of a capital project usually involves many public o¢ cials at
di⁄erent layers of the public administration and its execution is often con-
tracted out to private enterprises, the above two circumstances determined
that huge amounts of public funds were allocated across provinces and that
a large number of public o¢ cials had high discretionary power in the man-
agement of the funds, mainly those allocated to ￿nance capital projects.
Thus, corruption might have been particularly lucrative.
Third, according to Golden (2003) during the period from about 1948
through 1994 the deliberate behavior of the parliamentary o¢ cials, who were
concerned to enhance their own re-election prospects through a patronage-
induced votes system, was to determine the excessive bureaucratization as
well as the bureaucratic ine¢ ciency in the Italian context. ￿The provision
of services to individual constituents was provided by the system of political
patronage that legislator constructed, where patronage consisted of concrete
individual bene￿ts [...] and help in negotiating the complex legal regula-
tions a⁄ecting daily life.￿As such mechanism for amassing votes gradually
became inadequate, after a 1974 law that prohibited public companies from
donating money to political parties the Italy￿ s patronage system lurched into
becoming a system of political corruption, and politicians turned to extract-
ing illegal kickbacks from ￿rms as part of the process of bidding out public
works contracts. Thus, bureaucratic and political corruption coexisted.
After the 1994 Crime displays a persistent reduction. In principle, this
might have been due to a reduction in the fraction of crimes that end up
being uncovered and/or to a drop in the di⁄usion of corruption itself. There
are two indirect evidence, however, suggesting that the fall of Crime re-
￿ ects a regime switch and not just a change in the attention that is paid to
corruption. First, the subjective indexes of perceived corruption ￿ usually
employed in previous work on corruption across countries ￿ signal a lower
level of corruption after 1994. For instance, the Transparency International
this mechanism triggered large de￿cits for many years. See Cassese (1977 and 1983),
among others.
3As Loddo (2004) points out, during the 1950s and the 1960s the prevailing form of
government intervention to promote growth was in terms of ￿nancial incentives both to
￿rms and households; after the 1980, however, infrastructure investment was the main
policy instrument.
7index assesses the perception of corruption on a scale of 0 to 10: the value
10 refers to a corruption free country. Looking at the index for 1995, 1996,
1997 across 54 countries it follows that ￿countries normally hold their posi-
tions over the period. The largest positive swing in the three years available
is shown by Italy￿ : 2.99 in 1995; 3.42 in 1996; 5.03 in 1997 (Tanzi, 1998);
the average value of the index during 1998-2001 (2002-2007) was 4.85 (5.06).
Second, Transparency International reports anecdotical evidence related to
the sensible reduction of the cost of public projects after 1994, supporting
the idea that corruption dropped.
A reliable explanation for the drop in the level of corruption hinges on the
e⁄ect of Mani Pulite, the most important anti-corruption investigation ever
realized in Italy. Limited to the city of Milan at the beginning, Mani Pulite
quickly extended to the whole country and became very popular in 1992
because of the arrest of a public o¢ cial who was detected while receiving
a bribe.4. During the period 1992-1994, 70 Italian district attorneys inves-
tigated on roughly 12.000 persons; about 5.000 individuals were arrested.
The inquiries revealed a di⁄used system of corrupt practices involving en-
trepreneurs, bureaucrats, judges, and representatives of all political parties;
according to one of the public prosecutors at that time it was custom pay-
ing bribes in Italy.5 After Mani Pulite some politicians retired and some
political parties dissolved; the most prominent cases are those of Partito
Socialista Italiano and Democrazia Cristiana.
3 Empirical strategy
Following Becker and Stigler (1974), most economic studies on corruption
have been developed within a principal-agent framework, where corruption
relates to the misbehavior of a public o¢ cial (the agent) who takes bribes
from private individuals interested in buying from, or selling to the govern-
ment (the principal) some good. More in general, our empirical analysis
hinges on two basic assumptions which are consistent with many types of
4Mario Chiesa was arrested on 2/17/1992 while receiving a bribe for the awarding of
a public procurement. The investigation started one year before.
5Antonio Di Pietro argued that ￿Piø che di corruzione o di concussione, si deve
parlare di dazione ambientale, ovvero di una situazione oggettiva in cui chi deve
dare il denaro non aspetta piø nemmeno che gli venga richiesto; egli, ormai, sa
che in quel determinato ambiente si usa dare la mazzetta o il pizzo e quindi si
adegua.￿ (see Mani Pulite - anno zero available at http://www.societacivile.it and
http://www.cronologia.it/storia/a1992a1.htm.)
8corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000):
1. Public intervention requires the use of agents (public o¢ cials) to collect
information and implement policies.
2. Public o¢ cials are self-interested, possess superior information, and
are hard to monitor perfectly.
The risk of corruption is especially high for infrastructure investment be-
cause the discretionary power of public o¢ cials in charge of managing this
type of public funds can be remarkable. Figure 4 displays the time series of
infrastructure investment per capita at national level and broken down geo-
graphically. During 1980-1992 the level of investment in Italy ranged in the
interval 150-210 euros. After the currency crises in 1992 a sharp reduction
followed and a steady increment later on. In 1999 the investment per capita
reached roughly the same value as during the second half of the eighties.
The ￿gure also shows that the di⁄erence in the level of investment across
regions was not constant, implying that geographical disparities changed a
lot. For instance, in 1980 the amount of spending per capita in the South
was higher than that in the North, that is roughly 174 euros in the North
and 192 in the South, while the converse was true in 1999, that is 155 and
123 respectively. In our panel regression framework, variability of invest-
ment among di⁄erent years and di⁄erent provinces is crucial to identify its
e⁄ect on corruption.
In the following we test the e¢ cacy of Mani Pulite by looking at whether
it weakened the causal impact of public spending, mainly infrastructure in-
vestment, on corruption. In doing so we take into account (i) the lag between
measured corruption and public spending; (ii) the di⁄erence between e⁄ec-
tive and measured corruption; (iii) the spatial correlation among provinces
when Crime is considered; (iv) the possibility of reverse causality.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that eventually crimes end up being
uncovered with some lags respect to the date they are perpetuated and
that crimes committed at di⁄erent times may be detected in the same year.
At the same time, note that once a crime has been noti￿ed to the person
who might be responsible for it, the judicial authority will begin the penal
action after a period of investigation. Thus, our basic equation consists in
a distributed lag model where corruption Ci;t is regressed on past values
of infrastructure investment IGi;t￿j. In particular, we will report evidence
considering j = 2;3;4 as di⁄erent time lags do not have any relevance for
all estimated equations and our results suggest that the lag 2 of IG is the
9relevant one. In order to evaluate whether the ￿ght against corruption was
e⁄ective, we compare the dynamic causal e⁄ects on C of a change in IG
before and after Mani Pulite. A rolling procedure provides information on
the timing of the structural break.
Variations in Crime and Embezzlement do not necessarily imply that
actual corruption varied, as the formers may also be due to changes in the
fraction of crimes that end up being uncovered because of changes in the
enforcement e⁄ort. It is useful to distinguish between purely time variations
in the level of enforcement and variations in space and time. The former
may be a reasonable possibility when political or media pressures a⁄ect the
priorities of the law enforcers or the e⁄ort that judges and prosecutors ex-
ert.6 These factors would mainly trigger o⁄variations of enforcement whose
e⁄ects are to a large extent captured by calendar year dummies, ￿t.7 The
strength of enforcement may also be di⁄erent in space and time because of
di⁄erences in the number of judges employed or in their productivity.8 If
variations in the probability of detecting corruption were positively corre-
lated with public investment, than neglecting the former might induce to
erroneously conclude that a raise of public investment determines an in-
crease in the level of actual corruption when the correct conclusion is simply
that an higher level of judicial input determines an increase in measured
corruption. Further, the omission of the same variable when it is negatively
correlated with public investment might determine the result that public
investment would not be statistically signi￿cative in explaining variations in
corruption. Unfortunately disaggregate data relative to the judicial input
used against corruption are not available, thereby we cannot properly take
into account this issue. However, in order to mitigate the consequence of
the omission of a variable eventually relevant, we merge data for corruption
with an indicator of judicial e¢ ciency relative to the broad aggregate of all
penal cases for the 27 Italian judicial districts. Such indicator, Trial, mea-
sures the average length of penal trials and it is obtained as the ratio of the
6In general the e⁄ect of the probability of detection on the level of measured corruption
is ambiguous. For instance, a low level of enforcement may imply high incentives to
misbehave, and thus an high level of actual corruption; it also implies however a low
number of crimes detected, for a given stock of crimes achieved.
7Of course, such dummies also correct for possible spurious correlation between cor-
ruption and public spending due to common time-series factors.
8Note that measures of judicial input relative to all penal cases show that during the
1990s in Italy both the number of judges per inhabitants and their productivity did not
reduce (ISAE, 2001), suggesting that the strength of the ￿ght against penal crimes did
not reduce during those years.
10sum of the stock of trials pending at the beginning and the end of each year,
over the sum of trials started and completed in the same year.9 Finally, we
also take into account the possibility that the level of enforcement is serially
correlated thus inducing serial correlation of measured corruption.
Italy is divided into 20 administrative regions. Each region has its own
feature and di⁄erentiates from others mainly in terms of economic and social
characteristics. Hence, data on Crime may be thought as a cluster sample
where each unit, the province, is part of a cluster, the region. In this case
observations within a region may be correlated as a result of an unobserved
cluster e⁄ect. In order to allow for such correlation we consider the variable
IGPEi;t￿j which indicates, for any t ￿ j, the average investment across
provinces which are part of the same region as i (excluding province i).
In this way we also look at whether the di⁄usion of corruption in a given
province is a⁄ected by the level of investment (and thus by the di⁄usion
of corruption) which characterizes other provinces within the region. Ex-
ante, we argue that the sign of such peer (or cluster) e⁄ect is ambiguous
for at least two reasons. One may assume that a capital project crosses
the border of a single province and thus it is managed by public o¢ cials of
adjacent provinces within the region. In such a case we may expect that
the di⁄usion of corruption in province i is positively correlated with the
di⁄usion of corruption in the rest of the region and thus we should estimate
a positive peer e⁄ect. However, it can also be the case that the detection
of corruption in a given province may discourage public o¢ cials of other
provinces to become corrupted, thus determining a negative peer e⁄ect.
Finally, we also recognize time constant unobserved e⁄ects, ￿i, a⁄ecting
corruption. Treisman (2000) shows that di⁄erent values of subjective index
of corruption across the world appears to be correlated with country di⁄er-
ences related to religion, institutional environment, and those aspects which
characterize the social and cultural origins of a country. In general, it is ap-
propriate to assume that such factors are time-invariant but heterogeneously
distributed among areas within a country. This is mainly true in Italy which
is traditionally characterized by large social and cultural di⁄erences.10
9In the following we report results relative to the ￿rst degree of judgement (Istruttoria
and Primo Grado). The main conclusion however holds by also considering the second
degree of judgement (Appello).
10Cross-country data show signi￿cative correlations between the level of income and
some proxies for institutional environment and cultural origin. Thus, allowing for unob-
served heterogeneity we also control for inequality in terms of income.
11Thus, when Crime measures corruption the basic equation we deal with
is




￿jIGi;t￿j + ￿jTriali;t￿j + ￿jIGPEi;t￿j
￿
+ ￿i + "i;t
while IGPE is removed when Embezzlement is considered. Depending upon
the assumptions concerning the correlation between ￿i and the explanatory
variables xi;t, the serial correlation of "i;t and the exogeneity of public in-
vestment, di⁄erent estimators will be considered.
4 Corruption and public spending: Evidence from
Italy
As a benchmark the ￿rst two columns of table 3 show estimates of ￿j when
we either exclude all controls or simply allow for ￿t.11 In both circumstances
the regression coe¢ cient of IGi;t￿2 is positive and highly statistically signif-
icant; the null hypothesis that the calendar year e⁄ects (not reported) are
jointly zero is rejected at the 1-percent signi￿cance level.
Let assume the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous conditional
on the unobserved e⁄ect ￿i. Since public investment has been a main pol-
icy instrument for reducing inequalities in Italy, it follows that ￿i may be
correlated with IG due to the correlation between ￿i and the level of in-
come. Under this assumption the so-called Fixed-E⁄ects (FE) estimator
would produce unbiased estimates. A formal Hausman test, however, does
not strongly support such hypothesis; thus, we report results relative to both
the FE and Random-E⁄ects (RE) estimators. Looking at FE, coe¢ cients
related to public investment are substantially the same as before: those rel-
ative to lags two and three are positive while the coe¢ cient of IGi;t￿4 is
roughly zero; the total e⁄ect of IG is estimated positive and statistically
signi￿cant at the 1-percent signi￿cance level. Moreover, the F-test clearly
suggests to reject the null hypothesis that the unobserved e⁄ects are jointly
zero. The RE estimate corroborates the positive and signi￿cant impact of
infrastructure investment on corruption; the slight di⁄erence between the
FE and RE results is consistent with the result of the Hausman test.
As concerns the peer e⁄ect, we do not estimate any e⁄ect at all for the
variables relative to lags ￿2 and ￿3; we estimate, instead, a negative and
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect for IGPEi;t￿4, under both estimators. Since
11In general all variables but Trial are always expressed per thousand of inhabitants.
12the direct impact of infrastructure investment on corruption is (positive and)
statistically signi￿cant mainly at lag two, while the indirect impact through
the peer e⁄ect is estimated (negative and) statistically signi￿cant at lag
four, we argue that the variable IGPE might capture the deterring e⁄ect
on corruption which is due to the detection of corruption itself. Trial does
not appear to be relevant in explaining our measure of corruption, mainly
because of the correlation with the time dummies which also control for
variations in law enforcement. In fact, when the dummies are removed from
the estimated equations Trial tends to become statistically signi￿cant; at the
same time, removing the time dummies does not a⁄ect at all the relationship
between corruption and investment (eventually the t-ratios increase).
In general, lags of the dependent variable may alleviate the possible
mispeci￿cation induced by the omission of relevant variables. In the present
framework, if the level of enforcement is serially correlated then lags of Crime
may also control for such correlation.12 Thus, we extend the basic equation
considering Ci;t￿1 and Ci;t￿2 and apply the Arellano-Bond estimator to
￿Ci;t = ￿t + ￿1￿Ci;t￿1 + ￿2￿Ci;t￿2 + P4
j=2 ￿
￿
￿jIGi;t￿j + ￿jTriali;t￿j + ￿jIGPEi;t￿j
￿
+ ￿!i;t (1)
Again the impact of IG on Crime is positive and signi￿cant; the point es-
timates of ￿2 and ￿3 are higher than before and more precisely estimated
(see table 3, last column). As expected, the test of autocorrelation (not
reported) suggests to reject the null hypothesis of second order autocorrela-
tion of disturbances implying consistency of estimates.13 Hence, our results
formally corroborate the idea of a causal impact of public investment on
corruption in Italy.
In order to investigate on the impact of Mani Pulite we now split the
sample into two parts assuming that a structural break in the linkage be-
tween corruption and investment realized in 1994, that is when the most
popular trials related to Mani Pulite ended.14 Moreover, we also consider
separately the investments in Buildings, Transports, and Sanitation-Energy-
Reclamation (SER) to look at whether a speci￿c type of investment was
12Actually, a standard test of autocorrelation between errors at t and t￿1 suggests that
observations for the same province are correlated over time.
13Further lags of the dependent variable do not alter at all our results. Moreover,
our conclusions are not a⁄ected by correcting the standard errors for the presence of
heteroschedasticity.
14A symbol of Mani Pulite has been the prosecution against Sergio Cusani, who was
arrested on 7/23/93. The trial against him started on 10/13/93 and ended ￿ with the
condemn ￿ on 4/28/94 (see, among others, Europeo, various issues).
13mainly relevant for corruption. Results give strong credit to our hypothesis.
When total investment is considered, it turns out that after Mani Pulite the
coe¢ cient of IGi;t￿2 is still positive but not statistically signi￿cant while
that relative to IGi;t￿3 becomes negative (table 4). Overall, the sum of the
two coe¢ cients is estimated positive and signi￿cant before Mani Pulite; it
becomes instead negative and not signi￿cant for the following years. This
conclusion is strengthened considering Buildings and SER: the impact of
IGi;t￿2 is positive and strongly signi￿cant before Mani Pulite while it be-
comes not statistically di⁄erent from zero later on.15 In particular, before
Mani Pulite the total e⁄ect of investment in Buildings on corruption equals
0.33, which implies a long-run e⁄ect roughly equals to 0.40, that is 4 times
as larger as that relative to total investment. According to this estimate,
an increase of public spending in Buildings which equals to one standard
deviation feeds a number of corruption crimes prosecuted which is about
50% of its standard deviation. We do not ￿nd instead any e⁄ect on Crime
of Transport in both sub-periods considered.
A rolling procedure supports our choice about the breaking year. Table
5 shows how the e⁄ect on corruption of IG changes by removing or adding
up one or more years to the each sub-period previously considered. For
instance, looking at Buildings it comes out that, as expected, ￿2 is increasing
and statistically signi￿cant adding up years up to 1994, while it drops down
when the 1995 is also considered. A similar path holds for ￿2+￿3+￿4 which
becomes not statistically di⁄erent from zero looking at 1985-95. Similarly,
when we extend backward the second sub-period than the sum of coe¢ cients
increases and, in the case of SER, it also becomes statistically signi￿cant.
Finally, note that results relative to sub-samples before 1992 are consistent
with the main evidence and provide further support to our conclusions; for
instance, restricting to the ￿ve years before Mani Pulite, that is 1987-1991,
￿2 for Buildings (SER) is 0:0872 (0:0436) while the corresponding t-ratio is
2:36 (2:53).
Although it is plausible that higher public spending leads to more cor-
ruption we cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality. For a given
amount of total spending, the distribution of investment across provinces
may be distorted by di⁄erences in corruptibility: provinces characterized by
an higher level of corruptibility tend to force for an higher level of investment
in order to collect higher bribes and thus end up with more corruption. At
15In general, the same results hold when the three types of public investment are entered
the estimated regression simultaneously.
14the same time, more corruptibility may also induce higher level of spending
for a given project, as public o¢ cials might in￿ ate the amount they spend to
increase their illegal yields.16 Arguably, it is plausible to rule out contempo-
raneous correlation between corruptibility and investment because the dis-
torted or in￿ ated level of spending would be realized with some delay respect
to its decision; hence, eventually public spending should be considered pre-
determined, conditional on ￿i, rather than strictly exogenous. If measured
corruption in t is a proxy for e⁄ective corruption in t or t￿1, then the GMM
evidence reported above satisfy the su¢ cient condition for consistency, that
is E (￿!i;t￿xi;t￿j) = 0 with x = IG;Trial;IGPE. If Ci;t would measure
instead corruption in t￿2, then ￿!i;t and ￿IGi;t￿2 (or ￿IGPEi;t￿2) might
be correlated, through the correlation between IGi;t￿2 and !i;t￿1, determin-
ing inconsistent estimates. In order to investigate on this possibility, let
consider a reduced version of equation (1) by dropping IG and IGPE in
t ￿ 3 and t ￿ 4. In this case, under the assumption E (￿!i;t￿xi;t￿j) = 0
the GMM estimate of ￿2 for Buildings before Mani Pulite would be 0:1320
(t-ratio 3:17). If we assume instead E (￿!i;t￿xi;t￿j) 6= 0 then a consistent
estimator is delivered by instrumenting investment in t ￿ 2 with its past
values. The implied estimate of ￿2 is however very similar to the previous
one: 0:1322 (t-ratio 2:25); moreover, it follows again that the positive e⁄ect
of IG on Crime disappears after Mani Pulite.17 Thus, our main conclusion
is robust to the possibility of feedback from corruptibility to investment.
Finally, note that a version of the Granger-causality test provides further
support to our conclusion. We have tested the overall signi￿cance of the
coe¢ cients of lagged Crime in a regression of IG on lags of Crime and
IG itself up to 5 (as well as on year and province dummies). For both
Buildings and SER and applying the FE and GMM estimators it follows
that Crime does not Granger-cause investment. Although Granger-causality
di⁄ers from causality, we speculate that this ￿nding corroborates the causal
interpretation suggested in this paper.
16Note that previous evidence is not a⁄ected by reverse causality if its e⁄ect on the
cross-sectional distribution of investment is constant through time.
17Note that we are forced to drop investment in t ￿ 3 and t ￿ 4 to get a consistent
estimate of ￿2, under the assumption of reverse causality, as otherwise instruments would
be very weak and thus our results not reliable. Details are available from the authors
upon request.
154.1 Further results
There are some reasons for arguing that the relation between corruption
and public spending might be non-linear, weakening or strengthening for
either low or high investment volumes. For instance, the shortage of public
funds may be accompanied by heightened controls within the public admin-
istration, thereby forcing public o¢ cials to be more cautious when handling
with low amounts of investment. At the same time, it may happen that the
relation weakens for large amounts of spending when very costly projects
induce greater attention of everyone in the economy. Thus, we introduce a
quadratic term of the level of investment in the speci￿cation of table 4, but
its impact proves to be not statistically di⁄erent from zero.
Using a sample of 80 democracies during the 1990s, Persson, Tabellini
and Trebbi (2003) ￿nd evidence that corruption is a⁄ected by electoral rules;
in particular, countries adopting a ￿majoritan system￿tend to have less cor-
ruption than countries voting under ￿proportional system￿ . Since a propor-
tional electoral rule is more likely to lead to a coalition government while a
majoritan one is more likely to lead to a single-party government, voters may
more easily identify the responsible of a bad performance under the latter
form of government than under the former. Thus, in a ￿majoritan system￿
the electoral outcome is more sensitive to the performance of the incumbent
reducing the incentive for corruption. During the 1990s Italy adopted a new
electoral rule characterized by a lower degree of proportionality than before.
Thus, the slowdown of corruption in the second half of the 1990s may be at
least in part related to the new electoral rule.18 In order to allow for such
possibility we measure for each province and each electoral competition in
the period of interest the Her￿ndhal index relative to the distribution of the
number of votes that each party received (as a ratio respect to the total
number of valid votes in the election). By including such index into the set
of regressors does not a⁄ect, however, previous conclusions at all. In general,
the impact of the concentration of political power is estimated negative but
not statistically signi￿cant.
Until now we have exploited the total variability of the data. Evidence
reported in table 6 is obtained by regressing the time-average of Crime
on the averages of IG, IGPE, and Trial, controlling for the initial level of
value added, VA, as a proxy for inequalities among provinces previously
18Note that Del Monte and Papagni (2008) recognize, however, that the new electoral
rule have increased political stability in Italy which, in turn, may actually have increased
the incentives for corruption.
16captured by the province e⁄ects. In this way only the ￿between variation￿
of the variables becomes relevant. Results again show a positive relationship
between corruption and investment before Mani Pulite ￿ whose statistical
signi￿cance does not depend on the set of control variables ￿ and that
such relationship is not statistically signi￿cant later on. In particular, note
that the impact of investment in Buildings on corruption before Mani Pulite
turns out to be very similar to the FE and GMM panel estimates previously
considered.
4.1.1 Embezzlement across Italian regions
Our main conclusion on the deterring e⁄ect of Mani Pulite also holds when
corruption is measured by regional data on Embezzlement.19 Results in table
7 refer to an extended version of equation (1) which also takes into account
the GDP, a further proxy for the rate of deterrence, namely Police, and
the public spending for consumption, the latter being available at regional
level.20 In particular, public consumption is considered looking at its three
main components separately: General and Economic Services as well as
National Defence, CG1; Houses Services and Education, CG2; Health and
Social Security, CG3. Arguably, there is no clear presumption on the sign
of the relationship between corruption and public consumption. A positive
relationship might emerge if the same argument raised for public investment
applies. However, in general much of current government spending re￿ ects
previous commitments as it consists of salaries paid to public employees; of
course for such type of expenditure we do not expect any relationship at all
with corruption.21
The main evidence supports previous ￿nding: public investment relative
to Buildings, Sanitation and Reclamation, explains corruption before Mani
Pulite while its e⁄ect is not signi￿cant in the last part of the sample. Again,
we do not ￿nd any relationship between corruption and public investment
19Note that we consider Valle D￿ Aosta and Piemonte as an unique region; thus, the
total number of regions we refer to is 19.
20Police is entered with linear and quadratic terms to allow for its potential non-linear
impact on measured corruption. To save on degrees of freedom we report results consid-
ering lags ￿2 and ￿3. Conclusions are not altered when we allow for further lags.
21Results are based on the FE estimators due to the correlation between the unobserved
heterogeneous e⁄ects and the other regressors. A formal Hausman test documents such
correlation. Moreover, for all the estimated regressions the F-test suggests to reject the
null hypothesis that the regional dummies are jointly equal to zero, at the conventional
levels of con￿dence.
17in roads, railroads, and other transportation infrastructure. Some type of
public consumption comes out to have induced bureaucrats￿misbehavior.
In fact, we estimate a positive (and statistically signi￿cant) e⁄ect of public
expenditure in health and social security on corruption; again, however, af-
ter Mani Pulite we do not ￿nd any evidence of such relationship. We believe
this ￿nding to be suggestive because, di⁄erently from other types of current
spending, the social security expenditure increased substantially during the
1980s and in general its management is in part appointed to local bureau-
crats who thus entail substantial discretionary power. Hence, we interpret
this outcome as supporting the hypothesis that the discretionary power of
public o¢ cials in the management of public funds encouraged corruption in
Italy before Mani Pulite.
Looking at the rest of regressors it follows that the coe¢ cient of Income
is estimated negative, as expected; all other variables do not seem to a⁄ect
corruption in a relevant way.22
5 Conclusions
Looking at Italy since the 1980, this paper documents that a big push can sig-
ni￿cantly reduce corruption in a society otherwise characterized by a di⁄used
system of bribes and thefts. In particular, the paper provides evidence on
the deterring impact of Mani Pulite, an anti-corruption investigation which
was carried out by a pool of Italian judges in the ￿rst half of the 1990s.
Two main conclusions are achieved: (i) during the 1980s and the ￿rst half
of the 1990s corruption in Italy, at least in part, fed on the huge amounts of
public spending in social infrastructure, such as buildings, swamp and land
reclamation, as well as public spending in social security; (ii) the perverse
relationship between corruption and public spending collapsed just after the
prosecutions and convictions related to Mani Pulite. Evidence reported is
robust to di⁄erent types of estimators and measures of corruption. Of course,
whether these ￿ndings imply a permanent regime change induced by Mani
Pulite or a transitory e⁄ect is di¢ cult to assess given the data available.
22An important quali￿cation holds, however, for the variable Police. Both coe¢ cients
measuring its impact on corruption are estimated signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero if we
remove the regional dummies from the set of regressors, suggesting that this variable is
indeed e⁄ective in deterring corruption but the most of its variability is across regions.
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216 Appendix: Data sources
According to the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) crimes related to
corruption, embezzlement and extortion are part of the crimes against pub-
lic administration. In particular, ISTAT classi￿ed this kind of crimes at the
numbers 286 to 294bis of its analytical classi￿cation which, in turn, corre-
spond to the articles 314 to 322 of the Italian Penal Code. In details, ISTAT
classi￿cation is as follows:
286 embezzlement
287 embezzlement by drawing pro￿t from another￿ s error
287bis embezzlement to the damage of government
287ter misappropriation of yield to the damage of government
289 extortion
290 corruption for o¢ cial deeds
291 corruption for deeds contrary to o¢ cial duties
291bis corruption in judicial deeds
292 corruption of a party in charge of a public service
293 corruptor￿ s liability
294 incitement to corruption
294bis others
The Italian Penal Code states that crimes from 286 to 292 of ISTAT
classi￿cation may be committed only by public o¢ cials and persons in charge
of a public service, whereas crimes recorded at number 293 can involve only
individuals not engaged in the public sector, and that recorded at number
294 involve both public o¢ cials and individuals in the private sector.
Crime: The number of (recorded) crimes which determined
the penal actions. All crimes comprised in the above classi￿cation are
considered. The spatial distribution of the variable is given by the province
where the crime is e⁄ectively committed.
Embezzlement: The number of public o¢ cials convicted for the
crime of embezzlement. It comprises the crimes recorded with the num-
bers 286-287 of the above classi￿cation. In general, ISTAT records a con-
viction in case of an irreversible provision of sentence, whatever is the phase
or the degree of judgment. ￿La statistica degli imputati condannati riguarda
l￿ insieme degli individui condannati in qualsiasi fase o tipo di giudizio, con
riferimento al momento in cui, divenuto irrevocabile il provvedimento di con-
danna, viene iscritto al Casellario giudiziario centrale￿(ISTAT; Statistiche
giudiziarie penali, 2001, p. 29). Moreover, in the hypothesis of concurrence
22of charges, the individual is recorded only for the crime harsher punished
by the Italian Penal Code and other laws; while if the individual commit-
ted various crimes non in concurrence between them, he is recorded as many
times as many irreversible provisions of sentence he experienced. The spatial
distribution of the variable is given by the region where the crime is e⁄ec-
tively committed while the year refers to when the condemn is pronounced.
Data are available homogeneously up to 2000, as afterward ISTAT changed
the way of assembling the crimes against public administration.
The source of both variables concerning corruption is ISTAT, Annuario
delle statistiche giudiziarie (various issues).
Public investment in infrastructure. The source of the data on
infrastructure investments is ISTAT, Annuario delle Opere Pubbliche, (vari-
ous issues). The types of infrastructure are: Transports (roads and airports,
railroads and other kinds of transportation, ports and rivers, telecommuni-
cations); Sanitation-Energy-Reclamation (hospitals, electric and hydroelec-
tric plants, swamps, land reclamation, other categories); Buildings (public
buildings and schools; public spending devoted to private buildings). The
data are recorded in current price. We use a de￿ ator obtained considering
investment by region in the construction sector in order to express them as
millions of euro at 1995 price.
Police. The data concern the number of people engaged in the ￿Guardia
di Finanza￿ , ￿Carabinieri￿and ￿Polizia di Stato￿ . The source is CRENoS.
Data are available at regional level from 1980 to 1997.
Public spending for consumption. The source of this variable is
ISTAT (various issues). For the period 1980-1995, ISTAT presents data
according to the classi￿cation SEC79; later on according to the classi￿ca-
tion SEC95. Total consumption has been divided into three groups. For
1980-1995: CG1 (general services and undivided expenses, national defense,
economic services); CG2 (houses, recreational, cultural and religious ser-
vices, education); CG3 (health, social security). For 1995-2001: CG1 (gen-
eral services, national defense, public order and security, businesses); CG2
(environment safety, houses and territorial order, recreational, cultural and
religious activities, education); CG3 (health, social security). Slight di⁄er-
ences arise for CG1 and CG3 between the two classi￿cations. Values are
expressed as millions of euro at 1995 price.
Gross domestic product. The gross domestic product is measured in
millions of euro at 1995 price; data are available by regions and the source
is ISTAT (various issues).
23Population. The source is ISTAT, Statistiche Demogra￿che (various
issues).
Trials. This variable measures the average length of judicial proceedings
relative to penal crimes. The average length of judicial process is the ratio of
the number of pending judicial proceedings, at the beginning and the end of
each year, to the number of judicial proceedings started and completed in the
same year. The average length of judicial process is computed according to
the degree of judgement: the index is calculated separately for First Degree
(Istruttoria and Primo Grado) and for Second degree (Appello). The sources
of data are CRENoS and ISTAT, Annuario delle statistiche giudiziarie (sev-
eral issues).
Her￿ndhal. This variable measures, for each party and each election
from 1979 to 2001, the Her￿ndhal index relative to the distribution of the
number of votes that each party received (expressed as a ratio respect to
the total number of valid votes in the election).
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Table 1 - Bureaucratic Corruption in Italy over 1980 - 2001 
  Embezzlement  Overall Corruption   
  Total  Per capita  Per employee  Total  Per capita Per employee Ratio 
Crimes 




(0.24)  90 929  13,251 
(0.28)  232 2,391  0.39 
Notes: Crimes recorded refer to the number of corruption crimes for which the judicial authority has 
begun the penal action. Public officials convicted are those who experienced an irreversible 
provision of sentence (whatever the phase and the degree of judgment). Values per capita or per 
employee are measured per thousand of inhabitants or per thousand of employees in the public 
sector, respectively. Ratio denotes the ratios of embezzlement (total) over overall corruption (total). 
Values in parenthesis are ratios between total public officials convicted and those reported. 
  
















Crime  0.028 0.0340  0.0313  0.0132  1980-2001  95 
Embezzlement  0.003 0.0035  0.0033  0.0009  1980-2000  19 
Total Investment  0.195 0.1446  0.0896  0.1140  1980-1999  95 
Buildings  0.045 0.0398  0.0246  0.0314  1980-1999  95 
SER  0.090 0.0875  0.0614  0.0625  1980-1999  95 
Transports  0.060 0.0593  0.0464  0.0371  1980-1999  95 
Notes: Crime is the number of overall corruption crimes per thousand of inhabitants, by province. 
Embezzlement is the number of public officials convicted for embezzlement per thousand of 
inhabitants, by region. Total Investment is public infrastructure investment at constant price (million 
of 1995 euro) per thousand of inhabitants, by province. Buildings is investment in public buildings, 
schools, and public spending devoted to private buildings; SER refers to (public investment in) 
sanitation, energy, and reclamation; Transports is public investment in roads, airports, and railways. 
  
Table 3 – Corruption and Infrastructure Investment 
 Pooling-OLS  FE  RE  GMM 















































































NC (−1)        0.2431**
 
(8.58) 
NC (−2)        0.1097**
 
(4.39) 
N.  Obs.  1710 1710 1710 1710  1615 
R
2  within     0.14  0.14  
R
2  overall 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.12   
Notes: The definitions and data sources of the variables are in the appendix. All 
regressions, but that reported in the first column, contain calendar year dummies 
(results not reported); the time span is 1985-2001. FE stands for fixed effects; RE 
stands for random effects; GMM is the Arellano-Bond estimator. The t–values are in 
parentheses; significant coefficients are indicated by * (5% level) and ** (1% level). 
 
  
Table 4 – Corruption and Infrastructure Investment: The Impact of Mani Pulite 
 Total  Buildings SER  Transports 
 1985–1994  1995–2001  1985–1994  1995–2001  1985–1994  1995–2001  1985–1994  1995–2001 




















































N. Obs.  950  665  950  665  950  665  950  665 
Zero residuals 
autocovariance of 




































Notes: Estimation is by Arellano and Bond method for dynamic panel, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All regressions 
contain year dummies, NC (−1), NC (−2), Trial (−2), Trial (−3), Trial (−4), IGPE (−2), IGPE (−3), IGPE (−4), IG (−2), IG (−3), IG (−4). The 
table only reports results relative to the coefficients of IG(−2) and IG(−3) as well as their sum. The t–values are in parentheses; significant 
coefficients are indicated by * (5% level) and ** (1% level). 
 
  
Table 5 – The Impact of Mani Pulite: Sensitivity Analysis 
   1985–1992  1985–1993  1985–1994  1985–1995  1992-2001  1993-2001  1994-2001  1995-2001 































(–0.99)  Buildings 
















































(–1.45)  SER 

















Notes: Estimation is by Arellano and Bond method for dynamic panel, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All regressions contain year 
dummies, NC (−1), NC (−2), Trial (−2), Trial (−3), Trial (−4), IGPE (−2), IGPE (−3), IGPE (−4), IG (−2), IG (−3), IG (−4). The table only reports 
results relative to the coefficients of IG(−2) and IG(−3) as well as their sum. The t–values are in parentheses; significant coefficients are indicated by 
* (5% level) and ** (1% level). 
 
  
 Table 6 – Corruption and Infrastructure Investment in Buildings 
 Before  Mani Pulite After  Mani Pulite 
  1980 – 1989 1980  – 1994  1995 – 2001 


















VA95     –0.0011* 
 (–2.33) 












N. Obs.  95  95  95 
R
2  0.09 0.08 0.10 
Notes: OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The t–values 
are in parentheses; significant coefficients are indicated by * (5% level) and ** (1% 
level). IG, IGPE and Trial refer to the time averages relative to 1980-87 and 1980-92 
before Mani Pulite and to 1993-99 after Mani Pulite. VA81 and VA95 refer to the value 
added per capita in 1981 and 1995, respectively. (Note that the value added in 1980 is 
not available). 
 Table 7 – Embezzlement and Infrastructure Investment 
 1984–1994  1995–2000 

































































Police and Trial  No  No  Yes  No 
N.  Obs. 228 228 228 114 
R
2 within  0.65 0.65 0.66 0.31 
R
2 overall  0.30 0.42 0.44 0.04 
Zero residuals 
autocovariance 









Notes: Results are relative to the FE estimator. The t–values are in parentheses; 
significant coefficients are indicated by * (5% level) and ** (1% level). All regressions 
contain year and regional dummies, infrastructure investment in Buildings (IGB), 
infrastructure investment in Sanitation-Energy-Reclamation (IGS), infrastructure 
investment in Transports (IGT), public consumption in General and Economic Services 
as well as National Defence (CG1), public consumption in Houses Services and 
Education (CG2), and public consumption in Health and Social Security (CG3) with lags 
–2 and –3. GDP and Trial also are entered with lags –2 and –3. Regression reported in the 
third column contains police and police squared with lags –2. Coefficients reported are 
always relative to the sum of lags –2 and –3. Coefficients relative to each lag of the 
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